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 Abstract 
This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible 
Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following 
the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such 
as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by 
amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a 
new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to 
provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian 
protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal 
remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More 
broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-
Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global 
governance. 
 
The recent intra-state humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria have drawn attention to China’s 
evolving stance on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) concept, and also provided important 
insights into Beijing’s broader attitudes towards international law and global governance. 
While China officially endorsed R2P in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) its traditional emphasis on a strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-
intervention meant that Beijing remained cautious about international efforts to implement 
the concept. Given this ongoing resistance to R2P’s operationalization, China’s acquiescence 
to the passage of UNSC resolution 1973 authorising military action in Libya in March 2011 
suggested the possibility of a shift towards greater Chinese acceptance of R2P and UNSC-
authorised military intervention for civilian protection purposes.
1
 However, the way in which 
NATO interpreted its mandate for the use of force in Libya – coupled with the removal of the 
Gaddafi government - appeared to reignite Beijing’s longstanding concerns that R2P may be 
misused in order to pursue other strategic objectives such as regime change.
2
 China, along 
with Russia, subsequently vetoed four UNSC draft resolutions which sought to impose non-
forcible measures on the Syrian government. While brief moments of consensus within the 
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UNSC have allowed the passage of several relatively weak (and largely ineffective) 
resolutions on Syria, deep divisions between the P3, on the one hand, and Russia and China, 
on the other, have prevented the Council from agreeing on more robust measures to address 
the humanitarian situation.
3
  
 In response to Western criticism of the Russian and Chinese stances on Syria, Beijing 
has gone to significant lengths to explain and justify its position.
4
 China’s aim has been to 
demonstrate that its behaviour during the Syrian crisis has been constructive and responsible, 
rather than obstructionist.
5
 Beijing has defended its opposition to proposed international 
measures against Syria by reference to both international legal principles and pragmatic 
considerations. China has consistently stressed its preference for dialogue and other peaceful 
means of resolving the Syrian conflict.
6
  
 In addition to defending its stance on Syria, China has played an active role in broader 
normative discussions over the future development of the R2P concept in the post-Libya 
period. Controversy over the Libyan intervention has led to renewed debate among states and 
scholars over R2P’s third pillar – the international community’s role in responding to 
situations in which a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations against mass atrocity 
crimes.
7
 In late 2011 Brazil formally proposed the notion of “Responsibility while 
Protecting” (RwP) as a means of complementing and tightening this dimension of R2P.8  This 
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was followed more recently by the creation of a semi-official Chinese version of R2P known 
as “Responsible Protection” (RP).9  
 The RP concept originally appeared in a March 2012 newspaper opinion piece by Ruan 
Zongze, the vice-president of the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS), which is the 
official think-tank of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.10 An expanded account of the idea 
– explicitly framed as an example of China contributing “its public goods to the international 
community” - was published in June 2012.11 RP is concerned primarily, but not exclusively, 
with the most controversial dimension of R2P, namely non-consensual military intervention 
for civilian protection purposes. Drawing on both Brazil’s RwP proposal and the original 
2001 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) conception of 
R2P,
12
 RP puts forward six elements which offer a re-interpretation of R2P’s third pillar. The 
Chinese initiative is intended to first, provide criteria or guidelines for UNSC decision-
making on the appropriateness of military intervention, and second, ensure that any such 
authorised action is monitored and supervised adequately so as to reduce the risk of R2P 
being used as a smokescreen for other strategic objectives such as regime change. 
 After initially receiving little attention, RP has recently attained greater prominence. 
Although it has not yet been formally adopted by the Chinese government, RP was the 
subject of a CIIS-hosted international conference in Beijing in October 2013 which involved 
delegates from a number of states. Since that event, RP has been discussed in opinion pieces 
by two leading R2P figures, former ICISS members Gareth Evans
13
 and Ramesh Thakur.
14
  
Evans, in particular, sees the Chinese concept as a positive normative contribution, 
suggesting that “it should not be viewed as a rearguard action designed to undermine the R2P 
norm, but rather an effort to assume co-ownership of it”.15 Apart from these brief 
commentaries, however, there has been no detailed academic analysis of the RP concept. 
 This article examines the Chinese RP initiative and assesses the extent to which it 
offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the 
controversy over the Libyan intervention. It also briefly considers RP’s broader significance 
as an illustration of China’s growing willingness to assert its own normative preferences in 
defining and shaping international law and global governance. The article is structured in 
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three parts. Section I outlines the current concept of R2P and traces the main phases in 
China’s evolving relationship with it. Given that the central focus of this article is the recent 
RP idea, this section provides only a relatively short summary of Beijing’s earlier interactions 
with R2P since its emergence in 2001. Section II then analyses the six elements of RP, 
comparing it to Brazil’s RwP and the original ICISS version of R2P. Finally, Section III 
assesses RP’s overall significance, both as a normative contribution to the ongoing debate 
over R2P’s third pillar, and in the broader context of China’s position as an emerging great 
power that increasingly sees itself as a norm-shaper and norm-maker within the international 
system.  
 This article argues that although each of the elements of RP has its origins in previous 
R2P proposals, by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a stricter form the 
concept as a whole represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. While some 
aspects of RP are potentially problematic or in need of refinement, overall the proposal 
should be viewed as an important normative initiative aimed at facilitating further discussion 
of R2P’s third pillar following the controversies over Libya and Syria. RP is also significant 
because it offers deeper insights into China's current attitude towards R2P and global 
governance than can be gleaned from Beijing’s formal legal discourse within UN organs. 
First, RP indicates that China does recognise the need for non-consensual military 
intervention under R2P's third pillar, albeit under a more restrictive set of conditions than 
Western powers tend to follow. Second, several RP elements resemble UNSC decision-
making guidelines on military intervention, suggesting that Beijing’s position may have 
shifted from opposing R2P criteria towards recognising their utility. In this respect, RP 
continues RwP’s push towards “fleshing out” the normative content of what is currently a 
largely indeterminate third pillar. Third, in positioning itself as an “endeavour made by 
China… in building a just and reasonable new international political order”, RP represents a 
notable non-Western contribution to the evolving normative architecture on sovereignty and 
intervention.
16
  
 
I. R2P AND CHINA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONCEPT 
 
A. R2P and its evolution since 2001 
 
The concept of R2P developed in the aftermath of mass atrocity crimes in Rwanda, Kosovo 
and elsewhere in the 1990s. R2P represents a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between 
state sovereignty and human rights, in which sovereignty is viewed “not as an absolute term 
of authority but as a kind of responsibility.”17 The original 2001 ICISS Report sought to shift 
the emphasis in debates over international responses to humanitarian crises from the 
controversial notion of a “right to intervene” to the more palatable idea of a “responsibility to 
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protect”.18 It developed a concept of R2P consisting of three elements: the responsibility to 
prevent a population from suffering serious harm, the responsibility to react if such harm 
occurs, and the responsibility to rebuild after an intervention.
19
 While the primary 
responsibility to protect lay with the host state, if that state perpetrated “serious harm” to a 
population, or was “unwilling or unable” to stop such violence, the international community 
assumed a responsibility to protect.
20
 “Serious harm” was defined as actual or imminent 
“large scale loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing”.21 Military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes was envisaged as an exceptional measure within the framework of the 
responsibility to react. Importantly, the ICISS Report drew on the just war tradition in 
outlining a list of six criteria for assessing the appropriateness of military action: just cause, 
right intention, last resort, right authority, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of 
success.
22
 On the crucial criterion of right authority, although the ICISS Report designated 
the UNSC as the most appropriate body for authorising military action for civilian protection 
purposes, it suggested that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and regional or subregional 
organisations might provide alternative mechanisms for authorising force if the UNSC was 
deadlocked.
23
  
 Unsurprisingly, it was the military force dimension of the ICISS concept of R2P that 
generated the most controversy. From the outset, it was viewed with suspicion by China, 
Russia and a number of other non-Western states that have traditionally emphasised a strict 
interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs. These states were 
concerned that R2P’s military component might be used by powerful Western states as a 
cloak for the pursuit of other strategic objectives.
24
 Conscious of the need to assuage such 
fears and build support for R2P, UN officials adopted a diplomatic strategy of emphasising 
the less controversial elements of the concept, namely prevention and state assistance. This 
approach, coupled with ongoing resistance from R2P sceptic states, led to several significant 
modifications to the original ICISS conception of R2P. First, the military force dimension 
was placed exclusively under UNSC control within the existing collective security 
framework, closing off the ICISS’s suggestion that alternative authorisation mechanisms 
might be utilised if the UNSC was deadlocked. Second, the ICISS’s criteria for determining 
the appropriateness of military intervention for humanitarian purposes were removed. Third, 
the types of violence covered by R2P were limited to four mass atrocity crimes (genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than the previous less 
precise category of “large scale loss of life”.25 Finally, the threshold triggering the 
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international community’s responsibility was changed from a host state being “unwilling or 
unable” to halt violence, to the standard of “manifestly failing” to protect.26  
 The combined effect of these changes was that the conception of R2P unanimously 
adopted by UN member states at the 2005 World Summit was a softer, weaker version of the 
idea initially formulated by the ICISS.
27
 This modified form of R2P – derived from 
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 WSOD, and subsequently outlined in the UN Secretary-
General’s 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect – consists of three 
mutually-reinforcing pillars.
28
 The first is that each state has a responsibility to protect its 
populations from mass atrocity crimes. The second pillar stipulates that the international 
community should assist states in fulfilling their pillar one obligations. The third pillar 
provides that if “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” the 
international community is “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis”.29 
International action can encompass non-coercive means such as diplomacy and humanitarian 
assistance, as well as coercive measures, including the use of force, if authorised in 
accordance with the UNSC’s collective security mechanism.  
 It is important to note that R2P does not constitute a new legal principle according to 
the sources of international law.
30
 It is not part of any international treaty and has not attained 
the status of customary international law. The WSOD provisions on R2P were only included 
in a UNGA resolution, and therefore, are not a formal source of law. Instead, R2P is best 
viewed as a multi-faceted political concept that is based on existing principles of international 
law.
31
 As Welsh explains, “it is crucial to recognise that many states agreed to endorse the 
[R2P] principle precisely because it was not seen as transformational”.32 In this respect, it is 
worth emphasising that R2P’s third pillar does not alter the international legal framework 
governing the use of force, which permits military action only in self-defence or when 
authorised by the UNSC. Furthermore, R2P does not create any additional legal duties for 
states or international bodies. In situations where a state is manifestly failing to protect, there 
is no legal obligation on either the UNSC, or on the international community more broadly, 
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to take any action – forcible or non-forcible – to protect populations from mass atrocity 
violence. At most, the international dimension can be seen as a political commitment to 
consider possible courses of action that are available through existing institutional 
mechanisms.
33
  
 The version of R2P endorsed by states in the WSOD was a disappointment for some 
R2P supporters. Thomas Weiss famously called it “R2P-lite”.34 Simon Chesterman concluded 
that R2P’s “normative content had been emasculated to the point where it essentially 
provided that the Security Council could authorise, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had 
been authorizing for more than a decade.”35 While the emergence of R2P succeeded in 
shifting the language of the debate from a “right to intervene” to a “responsibility to protect”, 
the concept endorsed in 2005 failed to address crucial questions relating to when and how the 
UNSC should decide on the appropriateness of military action for humanitarian purposes. 
 From 2005 onwards, discussion of R2P within the UN system continued to centre on 
the less controversial aspects of preventive action and state capacity building. Despite 
lingering resistance to R2P from some states, including Russia and China, this cautious 
approach eventually led to consensus within the UNSC on resolution 1674, which 
“reaffirmed” the World Summit’s commitments on R2P.36 The first mention of R2P in 
relation to a specific crisis occurred subsequently in 2006 with UNSC resolution 1706 on the 
situation in Darfur.
37
 In 2008, the preventive component of the concept played a significant 
role in framing the international community’s response to post-election violence in Kenya.38 
A further UNSC resolution in 2009 provided additional endorsement of R2P in general 
terms.
39
 However, throughout this period, the ongoing resistance of some states to 
implementing R2P meant that specific references to the principle were not included in further 
UNSC resolutions on other crises. Instead, attention shifted from the UNSC to the UNGA, 
where broader discussion of R2P could be undertaken by all UN member states. This 
culminated in the 2009 UNGA debate, in which states overwhelmingly supported Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s report outlining the three pillars of R2P.40 Although this outcome 
appeared to vindicate the Secretary-General’s diplomatic approach, his strategy of 
emphasising the preventive aspects of R2P meant that contentious issues surrounding the use 
of military force remained unresolved.
41
 This indeterminacy in pillar three enabled virtually 
all states, including China, to continue to express support for R2P at a rhetorical level, but it 
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also papered over significant differences between Western and non-Western states’ 
interpretations of when and how R2P’s third pillar should be operationalized.42 
 The extent of those differences over R2P’s third pillar became apparent during the 
Libyan and Syrian crises which began in early 2011.
43
  While the passage of resolution 1973 
authorising military force against the Gaddafi regime was initially seen as a triumph for R2P, 
under the surface there were deep divisions within the UNSC. NATO’s support for the 
Libyan rebels and the eventual removal of Gaddafi prompted renewed concerns among the 
BRICS and other non-Western states over the potential for R2P to be used as a pretext for 
regime change. This led to extensive “blow-back” against R2P, which was evident in the 
UNSC’s inability to agree on any effective civilian protection measures on Syria. While 
India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) gradually adopted more flexible stances towards 
Western-supported proposals on Syria, Moscow and Beijing remained steadfast in their 
opposition to any international attempts to pressure the Assad regime.
44
  
 Controversy over Libya and Syria has led to renewed debate over R2P’s third pillar, 
with Brazil proposing its own complementary principle of RwP in late 2011.
45
 Despite an 
initially hostile response from Western powers and a lukewarm reaction from the other 
BRICS, RwP’s ideas for additional guidelines and accountability mechanisms to tighten the 
military force dimension of R2P appeared to offer a possible way of bridging the gap 
between Western powers and some non-Western states. However, Brazil’s early enthusiasm 
for RwP waned and it now seems unwilling to push the concept any further.
46
 This has 
created an opportunity for other states to take on the role of leading further discussion on 
R2P’s third pillar. In the September 2013 UNGA informal interactive dialogue on R2P China 
indicated that it “supports discussions at the United Nations to discuss RwP by Brazil”.47 The 
formulation of China’s own RP idea, plus its promotion through the international conference 
in Beijing in October 2013, points to China exploring opportunities to assume a more 
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prominent role in the next stage of R2P’s normative development.  
 
B. China’s evolving stance on R2P 
 
The complexity of China’s policy making apparatus means that it is not always easy to 
discern a consistent or unambiguous Chinese position on R2P. Shogo Suzuki has observed 
that a lack of transparency makes it “extremely difficult to know which faction [within the 
Chinese political elite] is ‘winning’ at a particular point in time, and how this reflects in 
policy output" on R2P.
48
 This opaqueness has led to various classifications of Beijing’s 
overall attitude towards the concept. For example, Jonas Claes labels China a “rejectionist” 
state, although he notes that Beijing “generally refrains from openly rejecting R2P”.49 Patrick 
Quinton-Brown, on the other hand, adopts a more nuanced categorisation, dividing R2P 
“dissenter states” into “cautious supporters” and “rejectionists”.50 In his view, China falls 
within the “cautious supporter” sub-group because Beijing has “agreed with the concept in 
principle, but will remain sceptical of its implementation in practice until it is modified to 
some extent.”51 As the rest of this section will illustrate, by the time RP was conceived in 
2012 China’s stance on R2P was best described as dichotomous: it accepted and was 
generally comfortable with R2P’s first and second pillars but remained deeply concerned by 
the potential implications of non-consensual pillar three action.  
 China’s relationship with R2P from the concept’s inception in 2001 leading through to 
the Libyan and Syrian crises can be divided into three main phases.
52
 These stages are briefly 
discussed here to provide background and context to Beijing’s formulation of its own RP idea 
in 2012. The first phase – from 2001 until 2005 – featured strong Chinese resistance to the 
original ICISS conception of R2P. The new idea represented a serious challenge to China’s 
traditional foreign policy emphasis on a strict interpretation of the twin principles of non-
intervention and non-use of force as outlined in its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
53
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Beijing was concerned about R2P’s potential for abuse by Western powers, and was 
vehemently opposed to the ICISS’s suggestion that military intervention for humanitarian 
purposes could be authorised by bodies other than the UNSC.
54
 As discussed above, 
significant modifications to the original ICISS concept were made, thereby enabling China to 
formally endorse the softer version of R2P that formed part of the 2005 WSOD. However, 
Beijing retained misgivings over the possibility of non-consensual coercive measures, 
including the use of force. 
 The second phase of China’s relationship with R2P – from 2005 till 2011 – featured 
cautious endorsement of a conservative interpretation of the concept, tempered by resistance 
to implementing the new doctrine in specific cases. This apparent softening of China’s 
traditional strict interpretation of state sovereignty and non-intervention should not, however, 
be over-stated. Beijing was careful to emphasise the primacy of prevention and state 
assistance under pillars one and two, while downplaying the potential for non-consensual 
third pillar intervention involving sanctions or military force. Cautious rhetorical backing for 
R2P as a general concept did not always translate into Chinese support for international 
action in specific cases of mass atrocity crimes. First, China abstained on UNSC resolution 
1706 (2006) on Darfur, in which R2P was mentioned for the first time in a country-specific 
resolution.
55
 Second, China (and Russia) vetoed draft resolutions imposing international 
sanctions on Myanmar (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008).
56
 Beijing’s overall position during this 
second phase was described by Sarah Teitt as “preserv[ing] the vestiges of its once firm 
stance on non-interference – the requirement for host state consent for collective military 
deployment – without appearing to completely turn a blind eye to mass atrocities”.57 
 The third main phase in China’s relationship with R2P covers the Libyan and Syrian 
crises during 2011 and 2012. At first glance, Beijing’s role in supporting resolution 1970 and 
acquiescing to the passage of resolution 1973 authorising military action in Libya appeared to 
signal a shift towards greater Chinese acceptance of R2P’s third pillar. However, a closer 
examination of Chinese statements within the UNSC reveals that Beijing was deeply 
uncomfortable with the content of resolution 1973. China stated that “is always against the 
use of force”, and had “serious difficulty with parts of the resolution”.58 Beijing’s decision to 
abstain from voting was shaped by an unusual set of circumstances, including the presence of 
regional support for international military intervention, the urgent need for international 
action in the face of Gaddafi’s explicit threats against civilians in Benghazi, and the rapid 
fragmentation of the Libyan government.
59
 Acquiescing to the passage of resolution 1973 did 
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not represent a sudden normative shift in favour of R2P’s third pillar. In fact, the way in 
which NATO subsequently conducted its military campaign in Libya appeared to confirm 
Beijing’s longstanding suspicions that R2P’s military dimension could be used as a pretext 
for pursuing other strategic objectives. In the UNSC’s May 2011 thematic debate on the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict China warned that “[t]here must be no attempt at 
regime change ... under the guise of protecting civilians”.60  
 The Libyan experience with R2P seemed to trigger renewed Chinese determination to 
resist efforts to impose non-consensual civilian protection measures under R2P’s third pillar. 
To date, Beijing has exercised its veto on four occasions, backing Moscow in blocking UNSC 
draft resolutions that proposed a range of non-forcible measures against the Syrian regime, 
including possible sanctions and referral to the International Criminal Court.
61
 It has also 
voted against UNGA resolutions on Syria.
62
 China has defended its behaviour on Syria by 
reference to both international law and pragmatic considerations. In respect of the former, 
Beijing has employed its traditional legal discourse on state sovereignty and non-intervention, 
consistently arguing that any international action on Syria must conform to “the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States”.63 
Pragmatic justifications for opposing tougher international action include China’s assertion 
that “sanctions or the threat thereof does [sic] not help to resolve the question of Syria and 
instead, may further complicate the situation’’.64  
 At the same time, it should be noted that Beijing has been willing to support several 
UNSC resolutions on Syria, including those mandating the UN Observer Mission, the 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, and most recently a humanitarian aid access plan.65 
However, aside from the two relatively weak aid access resolutions, each of the UNSC 
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resolutions that China supported involved proposals to which the Syrian government had 
agreed. These instances of UNSC action based on host-state consent are, therefore, 
fundamentally different from the imposition of coercive, non-consensual measures under 
R2P’s third pillar. While Beijing was often prepared to support the former, it remained 
uncomfortable with the latter. Prior to RP’s formulation in 2012, China’s position on non-
consensual pillar three action was summarised as follows:  
 
the prevention of such so-called abuses of power by other major countries that could threaten Chinese 
interests, along with the overall defense of the sovereignty principle, are regarded as far more important 
than efforts to end civilian killings in domestic conflicts, except, perhaps, in those rare cases when such 
actions clearly threaten international order or the international system. For Beijing, if there is any moral 
justification for external, coercive intervention against sovereign governments, it is primarily to prevent 
the disruption of international society through widespread (i.e., inter-state) violence and secondarily to 
prevent state-inflicted mass atrocities through strictly delimited and narrowly defined efforts.
66
 
 
II. CHINA’S “RESPONSIBLE PROTECTION” (RP) CONCEPT 
 
A. Background and context 
 
As noted in the introduction, the RP concept was developed in 2012 by Ruan Zongze, a 
Chinese scholar. Although it has not yet been formally adopted as official Chinese policy, 
there are several reasons to believe that RP represents Beijing's current thinking on R2P, or at 
least a very close approximation of its position. First, Ruan is the current Vice-President of 
the CIIS, which is the official think-tank of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
CIIS employs a number of retired diplomats and in recent years has played an increasingly 
important role in the development of Chinese foreign policy.
67
 Second, RP was promoted by 
the CIIS at a recent conference in Beijing in which representatives from other, predominantly 
BRICS states were invited to discuss the concept. This reflects the CIIS’s growing role in 
conducting “public diplomacy” on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 Third, 
the term "responsible protection" has been used, albeit briefly, in speeches made by Chinese 
officials, suggesting that the RP concept has received a degree of official endorsement.
69
 
 Ruan’s article has three distinct sections. The first is a lengthy and, at times, sharp 
critique of the West’s position towards Libya and Syria.  The second part offers several 
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“reflections” on what are perceived to be “serious flaws” within the current concept of R2P.70 
With a view to addressing those flaws and “contributing its ideas to the world” the third part 
outlines China’s own notion of “Responsible Protection” (RP).71 Overall, the article can be 
seen as serving dual purposes: first, it is an attempt to demonstrate that Beijing’s position on 
Syria is “fair and responsible”, and second, it seeks to offer a distinctive Chinese contribution 
to the normative debate over R2P.
72
 
 Before examining the elements of RP it is useful to briefly highlight the key themes 
which appear in the first two parts of Ruan’s article. These offer important insights into 
Beijing’s perspective on Western responses to Libya and Syria, and also reveal China’s 
concerns over R2P’s conceptual weaknesses. Together these insights help to frame the 
context within which the Chinese idea of RP is proposed. The first major theme that emerges 
is deep concern over R2P’s potential to be misused. Ruan accuses the West of having 
exceeded its civilian protection mandate in a “strategic attempt at realizing ‘regime change’ 
in Libya”.73 In its current form R2P is “liable to be abused”, and offers a “pretext” for the 
West’s “new interventionism”.74 The selective use of R2P – exemplified by Western silence 
over the violent suppression of demonstrations in Bahrain – is also mentioned as a factor 
which undermines the concept’s legitimacy.75 A second, closely-related theme is R2P’s status 
and relationship with international law. Ruan stresses that although R2P “remains so far a 
concept without being made a rule in international law”, it “could be abusively employed to 
change the state power of a country, which contradicts the purposes of the UN Charter and 
the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in other’s internal affairs”.76 The fact 
that R2P military intervention is only permitted with UNSC authorization does not assuage 
Ruan’s concerns. With the Libyan experience clearly in mind, he argues that “[e]ven if the 
UN Security Council passed a resolution, the Western powers could still make one-sided 
explanations and seek self-interests by abusing the resolution under the cover of ‘protecting 
the civilians’”.77 A third major criticism of the West’s perspective on military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes draws on consequentialist reasoning. Ruan argues that NATO’s 
military campaign in Libya has done more harm than good, and that “R2P has brought 
unnecessary chaos to international relations.”78 He criticizes what he sees as the West’s 
eagerness to use military force, questioning the assumption that “as long as the goal [of 
protecting civilians] is noble, it may be achieved with whatever means regardless [of] the 
consequences”.79 Overall, these three themes in Ruan’s article convey similar concerns over 
R2P to those expressed by Chinese officials within UN organs. They provide the background 
and context to China’s decision to propose its own RP idea. 
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B. The elements of RP 
 
The six elements of China’s RP concept are reproduced in full and analysed individually in 
this section. They are primarily concerned with tightening R2P’s third pillar framework on 
non-consensual international measures so as to reduce the potential for this dimension to be 
abused.  Although not explicitly framed in such terms, four of the six elements resemble 
decision-making criteria to guide the UNSC in determining the appropriateness of military 
action for civilian protection purposes. Element six concerns mechanisms to monitor and 
supervise any military intervention, while element five relates to post-intervention 
responsibilities to reconstruct the affected state.  
 As Table 1 illustrates, each of the six elements has its origins in earlier ideas found in 
Brazil’s RwP and/or the 2001 ICISS report, which in turn draw on aspects of the just war 
tradition. There are, however, several subtle but significant differences in how these notions 
are framed and interpreted in RP. In comparison with RwP and the ICISS report, on the 
whole RP offers a stricter, narrower interpretation of the permissibility of employing non-
consensual coercive measures under R2P’s third pillar.  
 
Table 1 – A comparison of RP, RwP and the ICISS report 
 
Principle/ 
guideline 
ICISS 2001 R2P 
Report 
Brazil’s RwP China’s Responsible Protection (RP) 
Just cause "unwilling or unable" 
prevent or halt large 
scale loss of life/ethnic 
cleansing 
N/A (but assumes 2005 
WSOD standard of 
"manifestly failing" with 
respect to 4 mass atrocity 
crimes) 
N/A (but assumes 2005 WSOD standard 
of "manifestly failing" with respect to 4 
mass atrocity crimes) 
Right intention "primary purpose must 
be… to halt or avert 
human suffering" 
N/A (but implied by 
requirement that military 
action be “limited to the 
objectives established by 
the Security Council”) 
Element 1: "the objects of protection 
must be the innocent people" and "peace 
and stability of the region" 
Element 4: "the purpose of protection 
must be to mitigate humanitarian 
catastrophe" 
Last resort Force only after non-
military measures have 
been "explored" 
exhaust all peaceful 
means; logical 
sequencing of 3 pillars 
(later relaxed to require  
“prudential sequencing”) 
Element 3: "exhaustion of diplomatic and 
political means of solution" 
Proportional 
means 
scale of military action 
should be minimum 
necessary to achieve 
protection aims 
use of force must 
produce “as  little 
violence and instability 
as possible” 
Element 3: "the means of protection must 
be strictly limited” 
 
Reasonable 
prospects  
"reasonable chance of 
success"; 
"consequences of action 
not likely to be worse 
than the consequences 
of inaction" 
“under no circumstance 
can it [military force] 
generate more harm than 
it was authorized to 
prevent” 
Element 1: must consider "peace and 
stability of the region" 
Element 3: avoid military force 
“aggravating humanitarian disasters” 
Element 4: "absolutely forbidden to 
create greater humanitarian disasters 
because of protection" 
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 Element 1 of RP provides that: 
 
First, the object of RP must be made clear. Of course, it is the people of the target country and peace and 
stability of the relevant region. The objects of protection must be the innocent people, not specific 
political parties or armed forces. Only such kind of protection is rightful and well-intentioned and is 
protection in its true sense.
80
 
 
This first element primarily draws on the just war tradition idea of “right intention”, while 
also touching on the “reasonable prospects” criterion. It reflects China’s longstanding 
concern that external intervention in intra-state humanitarian crises may be geared towards 
broader strategic objectives such as regime change, rather than being for genuine civilian 
protection purposes. Three aspects in particular stand out. The first concerns the motives and 
purposes of intervention. The original ICISS report drew a distinction between these two 
concepts by framing the criterion of right intention as follows: the "primary purpose of the 
intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert 
human suffering".
81
 This formulation acknowledged the political reality that it is rare for 
states to intervene in an intra-state crisis on the basis of altruistic or humanitarian motives 
alone. By focusing on the civilian protection purpose of intervention action the ICISS crafted 
a notion of right intention that was not overly restrictive. The version of right intention found 
in element one of RP is less nuanced, leaving open the possibility that “pure” humanitarian 
motives might be required before an intervention is deemed appropriate.
82
 If this 
interpretation is correct, this would impose an unduly restrictive condition on international 
action.  
 A second notable aspect of element one of RP is its emphasis on the impartiality of 
                                                          
80
  Ibid., at 11. 
81
  ICISS, supra note 12 at xii [emphasis added]. 
82
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Right authority authorization by UNSC 
or in exceptional 
circumstances by 
UNGA/regional 
organization  
authorization by UNSC 
or UNGA (under Uniting 
for Peace resolution) 
Element 2: "UN Security Council is the 
only legitimate actor to perform this 
duty" 
Monitoring 
mechanism 
N/A “Enhanced Security 
Council procedures are 
needed to monitor and 
assess the manner in 
which resolutions are 
interpreted and 
implemented” 
Element 6: “establish mechanisms of 
supervision, outcome evaluation and post 
factum accountability” 
Post-
intervention 
responsibility 
“The responsibility to 
rebuild… provide full 
assistance with 
recovery, 
reconstruction and 
reconciliation” 
N/A Element 5: “the protectors should be 
responsible for the post-intervention and 
post-protection reconstruction” 
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those intervening. The warning against supporting “specific political parties or armed forces” 
implicitly conveys Beijing’s disquiet over NATO’s direct support for rebel forces in Libya. 
An insistence on impartiality has also been a longstanding theme in China’s discourse on UN 
peacekeeping operations, with Beijing stressing that the UN must avoid becoming a party to a 
conflict. This raises the important question of whether civilian protection can be carried out 
effectively without the intervening states “taking sides”.83 One commentator has argued that 
“[t]he demise of a regime responsible for the mass atrocities that trigger an R2P intervention 
is logically inevitable”.84 Although further consideration of this fundamental issue is beyond 
the scope of this article, the key point is that China’s concerns over the motivations for, and 
ultimate outcomes of, intervention are reflected in what appears to be a stricter notion of 
“right intention” than that proposed by the original ICISS report in 2001.   
 A third significant aspect of RP’s first element is its reference to regional peace and 
stability. The importance of regional stability has been a consistent feature of Chinese 
discourse on R2P and reflects Beijing’s emphasis on maintaining balance and order within 
the international system. Its inclusion in the first element of RP is one of several mentions of 
this issue which relate to the “reasonable prospects” principle of the just war tradition. 
Explicit reference to regional peace and stability underlines Beijing’s preference for applying 
a holistic assessment of the feasibility of any international intervention. Under this 
interpretation considerations of potential success must be based not only on the immediate 
prospects of effectively protecting civilians within a targeted state, but also on the broader 
issue of the impact of international action on regional peace and security. Although the 
express inclusion of regional stability in RP distinguishes the Chinese concept from Brazil’s 
RwP, it should be noted that the original ICISS report also briefly mentioned the possibility 
of “larger regional conflagration” within its discussion of the “reasonable prospects” 
criterion.
85
 On the whole, however, considerations of regional peace and stability receive 
greater emphasis and occupy a more central position within China’s RP than they do in 
previous interpretations of R2P, reflecting the importance that Beijing places on this issue. 
 The second element of RP reads: 
 
Second, the legitimacy of the “protection” executors must be established. The government of a given 
state bears the primary responsibility of protecting its citizens. Besides that, the UN Security Council is 
the only legitimate actor to perform this duty while no countries have such a right, let alone the legal 
status to do so.
86
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This element represents RP’s version of the “right authority” criterion. It reaffirms China’s 
longstanding position that only the UNSC has the legal authority to mandate non-consensual 
civilian protection measures, including military action. This is consistent with the 2005 
WSOD provision on R2P but narrower than the ICISS version and RwP, both of which 
recognised the possibility of alternative mechanisms of authorisation - the UNGA or regional 
organisations - if the UNSC was deadlocked.
87
 Beijing’s rejection of the doctrine of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is reiterated in its warning that “no countries have such a right, let 
alone the legal status to do so”. Overall, this element of RP reflects China’s desire to maintain 
control over the implementation of R2P by ensuring that the UNSC retains exclusive 
authority and, therefore, that Beijing has the option of vetoing any proposed international 
action. 
 Element three of RP is outlined as follows: 
 
Third, the means of “protection” must be strictly limited. The prerequisite for invoking protection should 
be exhaustion of diplomatic and political means of solution. Non-military means like diplomatic efforts, 
though time-consuming, produce long-lasting results with lesser side effects. On the contrary, using 
military force at every turn would not only cause huge civilian casualties but also bring severe damage to 
infrastructure and downturn of national economy in the country or region to be “protected”, eventually 
aggravating humanitarian disasters and plunging the object of “protection” into protracted and distressful 
post-crisis reconstruction.
88
 
 
As illustrated in Table 1, element three contains themes which relate to several aspects of the 
just war tradition. The principal focus is the notion of military intervention as a “last resort”. 
While the preference for utilising “non-military means” of civilian protection is consistent 
with China’s broader policy on the non-use of military force, the language used here is 
potentially problematic. If the reference to “exhaustion” of diplomatic and non-forcible 
means of civilian protection is interpreted literally then this element would require a strict 
chronological sequencing of responses to a civilian protection situation. As James Pattison 
notes, “the  obvious and frequently noted problems with such an account are that, first, mass 
atrocities can continue to rage whilst all other options are pursued regardless of their 
feasibility and potential effectiveness and, second, the other options, such as economic 
sanctions, can cause more harm than [military] intervention.”89  
 These difficulties with a requirement to “exhaust” all non-forcible measures arose in 
relation to Brazil’s RwP concept note, which also implied a strict sequencing approach. 
Criticism from a number of Western states, UN officials and R2P scholars over this 
requirement prompted Brazil to shift towards a less restrictive notion of prudential 
sequencing that “should not be perceived as a means to prevent or unduly delay authorization 
                                                          
87
  See Table 1. Note, however, that Brazil appears to have retreated from recognising the Uniting for Peace 
resolution exception and is now wedded to the WSOD version of R2P which anchors coercive responses 
firmly within the exclusive control of UNSC. Therefore, there may now be no difference between the 
Brazilian and Chinese positions on this issue. See “Statement by H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, 
At the Opening of the General Debate of the 67
th
 Session of the UN General Assembly, New York” (25 
September 2012), online: United Nations <www.unoteint/brazil/speech/12d-Pr-Dilma-Roussef-opening-of-
the-67th-gerneral-assembly.html>. 
88
  Ruan, supra note 11 at 11-12. 
89
  Pattison, supra note 45 at 14. 
18 
 
of military action in situations established in the 2005 Outcome Document”.90 A similar 
clarification or refinement of RP’s interpretation of the last resort criterion is needed. In this 
respect, the original ICISS report offers a sensible, sufficiently flexible interpretation: 
military force “can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or 
peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing 
lesser measures would not have succeeded”.91 
 In addition to its focus on military force as a “last resort”, element three also contains 
themes relating to “proportional means” and “reasonable prospects”. With respect to the 
former, insistence that “the means of protection must be strictly limited” implies that such 
measures must not go beyond the minimum necessary to achieve the civilian protection 
objective.
92
 On the latter, the warning about military force “aggravating humanitarian 
disasters” reflects China’s scepticism over the effectiveness of military intervention as a 
civilian protection strategy.  
 The fourth element of RP provides that: 
  
Fourth, the purpose of “protection” must be defined. Just as doctors should not kill patients by means of 
treatment, the purpose of protection must be to mitigate humanitarian catastrophe. It is absolutely 
forbidden to create greater humanitarian disasters because of protection, let alone to use protection as a 
means to overthrow the government of a given state.
93
 
 
The major theme of this element is “right intention”. In this respect, there is some similarity 
between elements one and four. Both reflect deeply held Chinese concerns over R2P being 
used as pretext for the pursuit of other strategic objectives such as regime change. However, 
whereas element one addresses the “object” of protection (civilian populations versus specific 
political parties/armed forces), element four focuses on the “purpose” of external 
intervention. By applying a purpose-based assessment of right intention element four adopts a 
similar approach to the ICISS report. At the same time, however, the RP interpretation of this 
requirement is framed in stricter terms. The ICISS reference to “primary purpose” provided a 
degree of flexibility by recognising the political reality that there may be more than one 
purpose when intervening militarily.
94
 RP, in contrast, uses more absolute language in 
demanding that “the purpose must be to mitigate humanitarian catastrophe”.95 This provides 
another example of RP’s very strict, narrow interpretation of the requirements of just war 
theory.  
 A secondary aspect of element four is its assertion that it is “absolutely forbidden to 
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create greater humanitarian disasters because of protection”. This appears to be a further 
reference to the “reasonable prospects” criterion, which is also emphasised in elements one 
and three discussed above. In circumstances where external military intervention would be 
likely to exacerbate a humanitarian crisis it would not be considered an appropriate course of 
action.  
 The fifth element of RP reads: 
 
Fifth, the “protectors” should be responsible for the post-“intervention” and post-“protection” 
reconstruction of the state concerned. They should absolutely not smash and go, leaving a terrible mess 
to the country and people subject to “protection”.
96
 
 
This is an interesting element which extends the scope of the RP concept beyond its primary 
focus on R2P’s third pillar and the permissibility of military intervention. As Table 1 
indicates, post-intervention reconstruction responsibilities did not form part of Brazil’s RwP 
initiative but the idea did feature prominently in the ICISS report as part of the 
“Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of the original 2001 R2P concept. However, the 
notion of a “Responsibility to Rebuild” did not find its way into the WSOD in 2005 and, 
therefore, strictly speaking is not part of the current concept of R2P.
97
 Given Beijing’s 
repeated insistence that further discussion of R2P within the UN system must be based upon 
the WSOD version of R2P, it is surprising to see this earlier ICISS idea appear in China’s RP 
concept. One interpretation of its inclusion is that China is seeking to resurrect or resuscitate 
the “Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of the original ICISS R2P idea. This type of norm 
entrepreneurship would represent a significant, even radical, shift in Beijing’s approach 
towards R2P’s normative development and, therefore, seems unlikely.98 An alternative 
interpretation is that RP’s reference to post-intervention reconstruction is intended primarily 
as an implicit criticism of the destabilising effects of previous Western-led military 
campaigns, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This latter reading recognises that 
reconstruction and development themes form a central part of China’s broader perspective on 
peace-building but it does not assert that Beijing is specifically seeking to re-introduce the 
“Responsibility to Rebuild” dimension of R2P. The key point is that there is a need for 
clarification of precisely what is intended by element five. 
 The sixth and final element of RP is expressed as follows: 
 
Sixth, the United Nations should establish mechanisms of supervision, outcome evaluation and post 
factum accountability to ensure the means, process, scope and results of “protection”.
99
 
 
Element six calls for greater accountability and supervision of those carrying out UNSC 
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civilian protection mandates. This aspect of RP is not a new idea. Stricter oversight of 
international civilian protection measures has been a central theme in post-Libya debates on 
R2P, as a result of concerns among many non-Western states over the way that NATO 
interpreted and implemented UNSC resolution 1973.
100
 RP’s brief proposal makes a similar 
demand to Brazil's RwP, which suggested that “[e]nhanced Security Council procedures are 
needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and 
implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting”.101 One point of difference – whether 
intentional or not – is that RP does not specify where any future supervision mechanisms 
should be located, referring simply to need for the “United Nations” to establish such 
mechanisms. Brazil’s proposal, on the other hand, is more precise, explicitly calling for the 
creation of “Security Council procedures”.102 
 The idea of establishing better monitoring procedures raises a number of complex 
issues which, for reasons of space, can only be discussed briefly here.
103
 First of all, as 
alluded to above, there is the question of what form such mechanisms would take. Both the 
Chinese and Brazilian initiatives appear to suggest that additional procedures or perhaps even 
new supervisory bodies should be created to provide greater scrutiny of UNSC-authorised 
military action. However, there is no detail about how such mechanisms should be set up or 
what impact they would have on the wide discretion currently granted to the UNSC on 
matters of international peace and security. Second, it is unclear whether any new 
accountability mechanisms would apply to all types of UNSC-authorised Chapter VII 
military action, or only to third pillar R2P military intervention. As the former Special 
Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect Edward 
Luck has argued, it would be undesirable to impose “more restrictive ones [standards] for 
using force in Responsibility to Protect situations than in other situations”.104 A third major 
issue relates to the impact that enhanced monitoring and supervision might have on the 
effectiveness of UNSC-authorised military action. The concern here is that stricter 
accountability mechanisms could lead to the UNSC – or a new independent body - micro-
managing military operations to such a degree that the implementing states are deprived of 
the flexibility needed to achieve the civilian protection objectives mandated by the UNSC.
105
  
 Given the potential difficulties associated with establishing new monitoring procedures 
or supervisory bodies, Alex Bellamy argues that it is preferable to concentrate instead on 
inserting more detailed safeguards and accountability provisions into individual UNSC 
resolutions.
106
 He points to a range of existing measures including “sunset clauses”, “specific 
reporting requirements” and “specific limitations”, which can be used to ensure that 
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intervening states are not given carte blanche over the interpretation and implementation of 
civilian protection mandates.
107
 While there is considerable merit in Bellamy’s suggestion, 
the potential downside of this alternative approach to strengthening accountability is that it 
may lead to more complicated negotiations between UNSC members over the content of R2P 
resolutions. The greater the degree of detail and specificity in a proposed UNSC resolution, 
the longer it is likely to take and the harder it may be to reach consensus on the precise 
wording.
108
 The risk is that prolonged negotiations over the language of UNSC mandates 
could undermine the ability of the Council to mount timely and decisive responses to grave 
humanitarian crises.  
 As this short discussion indicates, there are no easy solutions to the issue of how to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the dual desires of facilitating effective, 
appropriately flexible UNSC-authorised civilian protection action, on the one hand, and of 
ensuring sufficient accountability mechanisms, on the other. RP’s proposal for better 
monitoring procedures clearly conveys Beijing’s deep concern over R2P’s potential for abuse 
but, in its current, very brief form, it does little to advance the discussion of exactly how new 
supervision mechanisms should be established. 
 After outlining the six elements, the overall merits of the RP concept are summarised as 
follows: 
   
In short, the idea of RP better embodies the purposes and principles of the UN Charter as well as the 
basic norms governing international relations, better conforms to the trends of peace and development of 
the present-day world, and is more conducive to building a just and reasonable new international order. 
Moreover, this idea is broadly based internationally.
109
 
 
At first glance this language might suggest that RP is being offered as a direct alternative to 
the current WSOD version of R2P. However, as illustrated in this section, RP is a narrower 
initiative which focuses on R2P’s third pillar, and in particular, the controversial question of 
non-consensual military intervention. It does not engage with, or seek to discard, pillars one 
and two of the existing R2P concept. Therefore, like Brazil’s RwP, the Chinese idea of RP is 
best viewed as a contribution which re-interprets and tightens the normative content of R2P’s 
third pillar, rather than as an attempt to replace the current version of R2P.  
 
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHINA’S “RESPONSIBLE PROTECTION” CONCEPT 
 
China’s RP initiative remains something of an enigma. As noted, it is yet to be formally 
adopted as an official Chinese position on R2P. In addition, the lack of detail in its six 
elements, coupled with the fact that several of them appear to overlap, leads to RP raising 
almost as many questions as it provides answers. A major unresolved issue is how those RP 
elements that resemble decision-making criteria are intended to operate in practice. There are 
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a number of questions here. First of all, are the RP elements proposed as criteria that would 
be formally adopted and codified in a new UNSC or UNGA resolution on R2P? Or are they 
viewed instead as providing informal guidelines to be used in UNSC debates? Given the 
limited prospects of reaching agreement on criteria in a UNSC or UNGA resolution, the latter 
option seems more likely, although further clarification is needed. A second important 
question is whether each and every RP criterion needs to be satisfied before military force 
can be considered appropriate, or whether action can proceed if there are strong indicators in 
favour of most of the criteria but not all can be strictly satisfied. Third, there is the broader 
question of the practical benefits and political utility of having criteria in the first place. By 
resurrecting the idea of decision-making guidelines – which featured prominently in the 2001 
ICISS report, the 2004 UN report A More Secure World,
110
 and the 2005 UN report In Larger 
Freedom
111
 - China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP concepts have prompted a renewed debate within 
R2P circles over this issue.   
 It is not possible here to engage in a detailed discussion of all the arguments for and 
against decision-making criteria. However, a brief outline of the basic positions in the 
academic debate can be sketched. On one side, Alex Bellamy maintains his longstanding 
sceptical view, arguing that: 
 
there is little evidence that, in practice, criteria would serve the goals of accountability by ensuring a 
shared understanding of situations and mandates and that the implementation of mandates would be 
consistent with those understandings. In the hands of skilled diplomats, criteria would likely merely 
become the language used to justify pre-determined positions.
112
 
 
On the other side, James Pattison has recently offered a detailed defence of the use of 
informal criteria.
113
 Contrary to the claims of some critics, he contends that appropriately 
flexible guidelines would lead neither to too much military intervention, nor to too little. 
Instead, according to Pattison, the use of informal criteria could help to improve the 
transparency of decision-making on the use of military force, and also encourage interveners 
to “live up to the requirements of the guidelines, which is likely to lead to intervention that is 
more morally justifiable”.114 In a similar vein, Wheeler argues that criteria would be of 
considerable value to R2P decision-making because they provide a “common reference 
within which argumentation can take place”.115 
 On balance, the case in favour of informal decision-making criteria seems to be 
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stronger. While using guidelines will not be a panacea, it does offer some hope of promoting 
greater openness in debate over the use of force, and will also help to provide greater 
precision to R2P’s third pillar. Given that both Brazil’s RwP and China’s RP have made 
guidelines a central part of their proposals for developing R2P’s third pillar, the issue of 
criteria must be taken seriously by Western powers. It is likely to continue to feature heavily 
in future discussions over the content and implementation of pillar three. 
 This brings us to the question of whether or not RP’s guidelines and the concept’s 
overall interpretation of the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection 
purposes are ethically appropriate. The risk in seeking to develop safeguards against R2P’s 
abuse is that it results in an excessively strict set of guidelines which ultimately pose an 
obstacle to timely and decisive international responses to humanitarian crises. RP certainly 
outlines a narrower interpretation of military intervention for civilian protection purposes 
than those found in Brazil’s RwP and the ICISS concept of R2P. As discussed in section II.B, 
some aspects of RP do appear to be framed too restrictively. One might ask whether there are 
any conceivable R2P situations in which military intervention would be permissible under 
RP’s strict requirements. In this respect, it may be tempting to characterise RP as a “mere 
spoiling operation with a more sophisticated face”, rather than as a genuine Chinese effort to 
engage constructively with R2P.
116
 According to this interpretation, RP is part of a subtle 
strategy of contesting and containing R2P’s development and implementation while avoiding 
the impression that China is outwardly rejectionist or obstructionist.  
 Determining exactly where RP lies in terms of contestation versus engagement with 
R2P is difficult. Like China’s overall relationship with R2P, the RP initiative contains 
ambiguity and inconsistency.  However, despite RP’s current shortcomings it would be 
premature to dismiss or reject the concept outright at this stage. There are at least three 
important reasons to remain open-minded about the Chinese initiative. First of all, the 
formulation of RP is a notable development in itself because it demonstrates the extent to 
which China is enmeshed in the ongoing debate over R2P.
117
 Simply rejecting R2P or 
remaining silent in the wake of the Libyan controversy appear not to have been viable options 
for a major power like China. Second, some of the apparently problematic aspects of RP may 
simply be due to translation difficulties or imperfect use of language. Beijing’s actual 
interpretation of the conditions under which military intervention is permissible may, in fact, 
be more flexible than RP’s wording suggests. A third reason for remaining positive about RP 
is that there is likely to be refinement and modification of the initial concept. Brazil’s 
experience with RwP is instructive here. The original Brazilian concept note attracted 
significant criticism from both states and UN officials, most notably in relation to the 
apparent call for a rigid, chronological sequencing of responses.
118
 However, once Brazil had 
clarified its position and moved towards a more flexible interpretation of sequencing, other 
states began to engage more constructively with RwP. This eventually resulted in RwP 
gaining a prominent position in the UN Secretary-General’s 2012 report on R2P’s third 
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pillar.
119
 A similar process of conceptual clarification, refinement and further discussion may 
occur with the Chinese initiative. The recent RP conference in Beijing is a positive first step 
in this direction which suggests that China is genuinely interested in engaging constructively 
in the debate over R2P’s third pillar. 
 In spite of the potential concerns and unresolved issues surrounding RP at present, it 
is possible to draw several preliminary conclusions about the significance of the initiative. 
The first is that RP is important because it offers deeper insights into current Chinese 
thinking on R2P than those provided by the often generic official statements made within UN 
organs. One crucial message from RP is that Beijing does recognise the permissibility of non-
consensual military intervention under R2P’s third pillar. Although China has never explicitly 
rejected such a possibility it has consistently emphasised that the international community’s 
response to major humanitarian crises should be based on assisting states, thereby implying 
that host state consent to external action is a prerequisite.
120
 Beijing’s preference for 
obtaining the consent of a functioning host state remains, but RP now acknowledges that in 
some circumstances - albeit very narrow ones – international military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes may be permissible even without such consent. This represents a 
notable shift in China’s position on R2P’s most contentious dimension. Another important 
message from RP is that Beijing has reassessed its stance on decision-making guidelines or 
criteria. Prior to the 2005 World Summit China (and Russia) opposed R2P guidelines on the 
basis that their inclusion could increase the potential for unilateral international intervention 
outside the UNSC framework on the use of force.
121
 The concern was that criteria could 
operate as a check-list which might be used to legitimise military intervention without UNSC 
authorisation.
122
 However, once the WSOD firmly anchored R2P military intervention within 
the UNSC’s exclusive control, closing off the possibility of alternative authorisation 
mechanisms or unilateral action, Chinese and Russian concerns were largely assuaged. Now, 
with the RP proposal, Beijing appears to have embraced decision-making guidelines as an 
additional means of reducing the potential for abuse of R2P. 
 As well as providing specific insights into Beijing’s current interpretation of R2P, RP is 
also significant because it offers a window into how China views itself and its role as an 
emerging power.
123
 Shogo Suzuki describes China having “dual identities” as “both an 
aspirational ‘great power’ which plays a key role alongside the West in global governance, 
and a member of the post-colonial state which views Western hegemony with a critical eye 
and sees the need to champion the causes of the developing world".
124
 Both of these identities 
are evident in the language of RP. On the one hand, the concept is framed as a responsible, 
constructive contribution to R2P’s normative development from a “leading actor on the 
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international stage”.125 On the other hand, RP conveys China’s deep scepticism of Western 
motives for intervention, and positions itself as a perspective which reflects the “general 
stand and concern of the vast developing countries”.126 While China’s growing involvement 
in international peace-keeping and non-traditional security arrangements such as the Somali 
anti-piracy framework points to a broader shift towards greater acceptance of its 
responsibilities as a global power, some of the language in RP illustrates Beijing’s continuing 
identification with the developing world. How these often contradictory dual identities are 
balanced by China in the future, and how this is reflected in its relationship with R2P, will be 
fascinating to observe.  
 A third significant aspect of RP is that it represents a distinctive, non-Western 
contribution to the evolution of international norms and global governance. This development 
raises a number of important issues relating to the processes of normative change and the 
impact of shifts in global power, which can only be briefly addressed here.
127
 Traditionally, 
normative development within the international system has been seen as the West’s domain. 
On the whole, within the academic literature non-Western states have been viewed either as 
passive receivers of Western ideas who are gradually socialised into accepting such norms, or 
as recalcitrant states who remain resistant to their adoption.
128
 This perception of normative 
development as a Western-dominated endeavour has been mostly true for much of R2P’s 
short life. This is not to say that contestation over the concept can be divided neatly along 
North-South lines, nor is it to ignore the important contributions to R2P’s conceptual design 
made by non-Western figures such as Francis Deng, Kofi Annan and Ramesh Thakur. 
However, as Oliver Stuenkel correctly notes, R2P has remained “largely dominated by 
established powers at both the policy and the academic level”.129 Now though, as global 
power shifts away from the West, the BRICS and other non-Western states are beginning to 
assert their own normative preferences more decisively across a range of issues, including 
R2P.
130
 Both China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP proposals are recent illustrations of the increasing 
willingness of emerging powers to play a role as norm entrepreneurs in crafting and floating 
their own perspectives on sovereignty and intervention. RP is explicitly framed as an example 
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of China having “the courage to speak out and contribute its ideas to the world”.131 Rather 
than rejecting R2P’s third pillar after its experience with the Libyan intervention, Beijing has 
attempted to re-define it by advancing a new, restrictive interpretation of the circumstances in 
which non-consensual civilian protection measures, including military force, can be 
operationalized. In this respect the creation of RP may represent an important milestone in 
China’s relationship with R2P, in which it transitions from playing a subtle norm-shaping 
role towards a more proactive stance as a norm-maker and norm entrepreneur. Although 
much will depend on the extent to which Beijing seeks to promote RP in the future, the 
formulation of a distinct Chinese interpretation is, in itself, a notable development.   
 There are at least two important implications of this shift towards a more influential 
role for non-Western powers in the development of international norms. The first is that 
Western states will need to adapt to a new international environment in which the 
redistribution of power means that they no longer hold a monopoly on global norm-making. 
Thorsten Benner observes that the West has largely been “unprepared for the non-linear, 
open-ended politics of norm contestation and evolution in which non-Western powers also 
play important roles”.132 This was illustrated by the initially hostile Western reaction to 
Brazil’s RwP concept, which appeared at least partly attributable to its source as a non-
Western proposal.
133
 With respect to China’s RP idea, Western powers should engage 
constructively with Beijing’s initiative, rather than dismiss it as an attempt to derail R2P.134 
In an increasingly complex normative environment in which certain tenets of the Western 
liberal order, such as R2P, are subjected to challenge or reinterpretation the continuing 
legitimacy of such norms will depend on the West’s willingness to accommodate non-
Western perspectives.
135
 The sooner Western powers recognise this, the better the prospects 
of bridging the current divisions over the content and implementation of R2P’s third pillar. 
 A second, broader implication of the redistribution of global power and the growing 
articulation of non-Western normative preferences is a possible move towards a more 
diverse, pluralistic international order. William Burke-White recently outlined the emergence 
of what he calls “a multi-hub structure for international law, distinct from past structures such 
as bipolarity and multipolarity.”136 Within this new configuration “a growing number of 
states play issue-specific leadership roles in a flexible and fluid system”, thereby operating as 
separate “hubs” of power.137 When these “hubs within the system seek to gain followers, they 
have opportunity and incentives to articulate distinct preferences for the evolution of the 
substance of international law that reflect their own interests and may be attractive to 
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potential followers”.138 Burke-White identifies Beijing’s preference for a more absolutist 
version of sovereignty as an example of rising powers offering an alternative vision to the 
West’s more conditional interpretation of sovereignty.139 By promoting a more state-centric 
conception of international law China (and Russia) may become hubs that attract followers 
among the BRICS and other non-Western states.  
 Recent developments surrounding China’s RP initiative support this perspective. First, 
the language of RP – framed as a concept that “expresses the hope that the voices of the 
developing countries are duly respected” – suggests that China is indeed positioning itself as 
a hub for non-Western states to attach to on the issue of R2P.
140
 Second, the decision to host 
an international conference on RP in Beijing in October 2013, involving predominantly 
BRICS representatives, can also be interpreted as an attempt to promote further discussion of 
the Chinese concept.
141
 These are signs that China may be seeking to build broader support 
for its own, more restrictive vision of R2P’s third pillar.  
 At present, it is unclear what this increasingly complex and contested normative 
environment will mean for the future of R2P’s third pillar. Three possible scenarios can be 
briefly sketched here. One is that pressure from China and other non-Western states could 
lead to the emergence of a more tightly constrained global interpretation of pillar three.
142
 
This could result from Western powers recognising the need to accommodate the types of 
decision-making guidelines and monitoring mechanisms proposed in RP and RwP. 
Incorporating such proposals into R2P – either formally or informally – would provide a 
greater level of specificity about when and how pillar three should be operationalised. 
However, the adoption of RP and RwP ideas would not go as far as creating a positive duty 
on the UNSC to take action in response to a manifest failure to protect, nor would it formally 
alter the legal framework on the use of force. Instead, the need for UNSC discretion to be 
exercised on a case-by-case basis within the existing collective security system would remain 
central to R2P’s third pillar. Under this first scenario, by evolving but ultimately remaining a 
global concept, R2P’s coherence and integrity as a universal norm would be preserved.  
 A second possibility is that failure to evolve at a global level could lead to R2P 
fragmenting through the formation of distinct or regional sub-sets of the concept. These 
separate versions might be based around distinct hubs, which would then apply R2P in their 
own area based on a regional or local interpretation.
143
 A third conceivable option is that 
neither of the first two scenarios eventuates. A re-defined, stricter global interpretation of 
R2P’s third pillar could fail to materialise, while initial signs of the emergence of alternative 
regional sub-sets might also run out of momentum. Under this scenario, we could be left with 
multiple, conflicting interpretations of R2P’s third pillar, none of which would have a 
sufficiently broad following to generate consensus – even within a regional or local 
framework - on international action for civilian protection purposes.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
China’s RP proposal represents an attempt to re-interpret R2P’s third pillar at a time of 
renewed contestation over the content and implementation of the concept. It reflects Beijing’s 
deeply held concerns over R2P’s potential for abuse. Although many of the elements of RP 
are drawn from previous initiatives such as Brazil’s RwP and the 2001 ICISS report, the re-
packaging of these ideas in a more restrictive form gives the overall concept a distinctive 
Chinese flavour. In its current shape, some aspects of RP appear to be framed too strictly or 
narrowly to offer workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military 
intervention for civilian protection purposes. Clarification and refinement is needed in certain 
areas.  
RP does, however, provide several important insights into the current Chinese stance 
on R2P. First of all, it indicates that Beijing does recognise that non-consensual military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes can be an appropriate course of action for the 
international community to pursue, albeit within a very narrow range of circumstances. 
Second, by including elements which resemble decision-making guidelines, RP suggests a 
shift in China’s attitude towards such criteria. Having previously opposed the inclusion of 
guidelines in earlier versions of R2P, Beijing now appears to view them as useful tools for 
safeguarding the concept against the risk of abuse. Finally, the creation of the RP proposal, 
plus its discussion at the recent Beijing conference, points to China exploring the possibility 
of assuming a more prominent role in the future normative development of R2P. Following 
on from Brazil’s RwP initiative, RP provides a further illustration that rising, non-Western 
powers are becoming increasingly willing to contribute to the evolving normative 
architecture on sovereignty and intervention. This has potential implications both for R2P and 
for the international system more broadly. One possibility, briefly considered in this article, is 
a move towards a more diverse, pluralistic normative order.   
RP’s impact on the future development of R2P will depend on how China proceeds 
with the concept, and how other states respond to it. If Beijing decides to formally adopt the 
idea and promote it internationally it could play an important role in future discussions on 
R2P’s third pillar. With Brazil appearing unwilling to push its own RwP concept any further, 
there is an opportunity for China to take up the reins. Two things could help to position RP as 
a useful normative initiative. The first would be to detach the RP idea from the rest of Ruan’s 
article, which contains highly critical language that could undermine Western receptivity 
towards the concept. A separate, revised account of RP that clarifies and refines the original 
ideas in more neutral language would be less likely to arouse suspicions over the motives 
behind the Chinese initiative. Second, Beijing could consider putting RP on the agenda for 
consideration at the next BRICS summit, with a view to achieving broader endorsement of 
the proposal.
144
 This could then enable it to be introduced for discussion at a global level 
within the UN system, in a similar way to RwP’s initial promotion by Brazil. If China does 
decide to formally adopt and promote RP in the future Western powers should engage 
constructively with the proposal. Its ideas may ultimately contribute to bolstering the 
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normative content and legitimacy of R2P’s third pillar, which in turn could lead to better 
prospects for operationalising this dimension of the concept. 
